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Abstract:  In many parts of the world, deteriorating environmental conditions have led policy 
makers to develop policies and programs aimed at promoting conservation practices on lands 
devoted to agriculture. Such programs have been studied by environmental economists, but little 
research has been done on the usefulness of strategically varying the conservation contract’s 
length. This paper uses theory and simulation to investigate the optimal contract length of land 
conservation programs when a policy maker tries to maximize the present discounted value of 
the stream of environmental benefits from the program. We find that contract length should vary 
with characteristics of the ecological processes that yield benefits from land retirement. Optimal 
contracts are longer when the environmental benefits in question – things like woodland 
biodiversity – take time to develop. However, it is not typically optimal to have the indefinitely-
lived contracts favored by some conservation groups, or even to offer contracts as long as the 
maturation period for the environmental services in question. In general, the optimal contract 
length depends on the trade off between an ecological effect (increasing the environmental 
benefits from one farmer) and an enrollment effect (increasing the number of farmers enrolled). 
Our findings also suggest that non-ecological regional characteristics (such as turnover rate and 
average farm income) could play an important role in the design of conservation programs.    2
1. Introduction 
  Over the last several decades, population and economic growth in many countries, 
including the United States, have resulted in the conversion of a significant amount of 
environmentally sensitive land to agricultural or urban uses.  In many parts of the world 
(including the U.S., the European Union, China), deteriorating environmental conditions have 
created such concern that policy makers have developed policies and programs aimed at 
promoting conservation practices on lands devoted to agriculture. Given the large expenditures 
governments devote to such programs – $1.8 billion in the U.S., $6.8 billion in the EU, and $2 
billion in China (Congressional Research Service, 2005) – there is value to exploring all 
dimensions along which the programs’ designs might be improved. 
  At the federal level of the U.S., the USDA Farm Service Agency’s (FSA) Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) has been the country's largest private-lands environmental improvement 
program. Its stated goal is to help agricultural producers preserve environmentally sensitive land, 
and thereby decrease erosion, restore wildlife habitat, and safeguard ground and surface water 
(USDA, 2004).  At the state level, programs like state Conservation Reserve Enhancement 
Programs (CREPs) allow farmers to receive additional incentive payments for installing specific 
conservation practices. Through a CREP, farmers can receive annual rental payments and cost-
share assistance to establish long-term, resource conserving covers on eligible land.  There are 
also programs like the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Programs (WHIP) and Wetland Reserve 
Programs (WRP), which targets some specific characteristics of farmland. 
  Ever since the authorization of these land conservation programs, participation in 
voluntary conservation programs has attracted substantial research.  Many papers have studied 
the minimum payment necessary to induce CRP enrollment (Tegene et. al., 1999), and some   3
have analyzed the optimal payment for a cost-effective CRP program (Parks and Schorr, 1997), 
but little research has been done on the potential impact of a varying CRP contract length and the 
relationship between the optimal CRP payment and the optimal CRP contract length.  The few 
papers trying to fill this gap (Gulati and Vercammen 2005), unfortunately, oversimplifies the 
problem by assuming that land always returns to pre-contact use after a one-shot contract expires, 
and maximization of total environmental benefits can be achieved by getting the most 
environmental benefits from a typical land owner. These assumptions are institutionally different 
from what is happening in the real world, where land owners often choose to extend the contract 
when the initial contract expires; and policy makers, aiming at total environmental benefits and 
faced with stringent budget constraint, may have to consider not only the benefits derived from 
one land owner but also the total number of enrollments.    
  An analysis of optimal contract length is valuable because it may provide policy makers 
with guidance regarding how to maximize environmental benefits in a cost-effective manner 
through adjustments in contract length as well as incentive payments. This paper provides that 
analysis, using theory and simulation to investigate the optimal contract length of land 
conservation programs when a policy maker tries to maximize the present discounted value of 
the stream of environmental benefits from the program. Section 2 provides background on 
voluntary land conservation programs. Section 3 reviews the relevant literatures on 
environmental benefits and conservation program design. Section 4 models the solution to a 
game between the government and farmers by finding a sub-game perfect equilibrium via 
backwards induction. The policy maker chooses a contract length and the associated payment. 
Given this contact length and payment, each farmer decides if she or he wants to enter into the 
contract.  The farmer is allowed to re-contract and thus remain in the program after the initial   4
contract expires, but the policy makers’ spending must be kept within the limit of a pre-set 
budget constraint.   The Bellman’s principle of optimality from dynamic programming is used to 
solve for the number of farmers that will enroll given a particular contract length and payment; 
this function informs the government’s contract design decision. Section 5 parameterizes the 
model and simulates the problem and its solution for several types of environmental benefits. 
Section 6 gives concluding comments and describes directions for further research.  
 
2. Background on U.S. Voluntary Conservation Programs 
  As the country’s largest land conservation program, the CRP was established by the Food 
Security Act of 1985.  From the beginning, the CRP has been tailored to the preservation of 
environmentally sensitive land and the reduction of erosion.  Enrollment in CRP is voluntary.  
To be eligible, cropland must meet several standards in order to be considered as 
environmentally sensitive.  In exchange for enrollment, farmers receive a package of benefits 
including rental payments and cost-share assistance.  FSA bases rental rates on the relative 
productivity of the soils within each county and the average dry land cash rent or cash-rent 
equivalent.  In addition, FSA provides cost-share assistance to participants up to 50 percent of 
the participants’ costs in establishing approved land covers.  
  Enrollment in CRP increased rapidly once the program got underway.  By the year 2003, 
nearly 34 million acres were enrolled at an annual rental cost of $1.8 billion.  In exchange for 
retiring eligible land for 10-15 years, participants received an annual rental payment that 
averaged roughly $50/acre, and were reimbursed for half of the cost of establishing permanent 
cover (usually grasses or trees).  The potential benefits of CRP to society as a whole, as well as 
to farmland owners, have made the program a recurring focus of farm program legislation.   5
  The Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) is an offshoot of the CRP.  By 
combining CRP resources with state and private programs, CREP provides farmers with a 
financial package for conserving and enhancing the natural resources of farms.  Enrollment in a 
state is limited to specific geographic areas and practices.  CREPs differ across states, but many 
require a 10- to 15-year commitment to keep lands out of agricultural production.  CREP 
provides payments to participants who offer eligible land.  A federal annual rental rate, including 
an FSA state committee-determined maintenance incentive payment, is offered, plus cost-share 
of up to 50 percent of the eligible costs to install the practice.  Further, the programs generally 
offer a sign-up incentive for participants to install specific practices. 
  FSA uses CRP funding to pay a percentage of the program's cost, while state 
governments provide the rest of the funds.  States and private groups involved in the effort may 
also provide technical support and other in-kind services.  To be eligible, land must be owned or 
leased for at least one year prior to enrollment, and must be crop land. Land must also meet 
cropping history and other eligibility requirements.  Unlike CRP, CREP enrollment can be on a 
continuous basis, permitting farmers to join the program at any time rather than waiting for 
specific sign-up periods. 
Among programs that target specific characteristics of farmland, the Wildlife Habitat 
Incentive Program (WHIP) and Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) have enjoyed great popularity.  
WHIP is a voluntary state-level program that encourages creation of high quality wildlife 
habitats.  Since WHIP began in 1998, nearly 14,700 participants have enrolled more than 2.3 
million acres into the program. NRCS provides cost-share payments to landowners under these 
agreements that are usually 5 to 10 years in duration, depending upon the practices to be installed.  
They may also provide greater cost-share assistance to landowners who enter into agreements of   6
15 years or more for practices on essential plant and animal habitat.  Priority is usually given to 
habitat areas for wildlife species experiencing declining or significantly reduced populations and 
practices beneficial to fish and wildlife that may not otherwise be funded. 
WRP aims mainly at wetland conservation.  The program provides an opportunity for 
landowners to receive financial incentives to restore, protect, and enhance wetlands by retiring 
marginal land from agriculture. The program offers three enrollment options.  The first option is 
a conservation easement in perpetuity. Easement payments for this option are usually the 
agricultural value of the land plus 100 percent of the costs of restoring the wetland.  The second 
option is a 30-year contract where easement payments are 75 percent of what would be paid for a 
permanent easement plus 75 percent of restoration costs.  The last option pays up to 75 percent 
of the cost of the restoration activity on contract of 10 years. 
These programs yield a wide range of ecological benefits: erosion control, improved 
wildlife populations in grasslands and forests, and wetland services such as flood control and 
nutrient filtration that reduces excess nutrient levels in surface water. For at least some of these 
ecological services, the annual flow of benefits may increase as a function of time in a manner 
dictated by ecological processes. Variation in the nature of those functions might dictate that 
efficient conservation programs should offer contracts of varied lengths that depend on the 
nature of the service to be generated. 
 
3. Literature Review  
  We base our work upon findings from literatures in two disciplines. In order to develop a 
reasonable specification for the environmental benefits function, we draw upon work in ecology   7
and plant and animal biology. In contrast, our model of the behavior of landowners and the 
policy maker is informed by the economics literature.  
 
3.1 Environmental benefit functions: Hobbs and Harris (2001) shows the relative 
abundance of species at five different stages of abandonment in old fields in Southern Illinois.  
Their results suggest that some species may need more than 25 to 40 years to be fully restored at 
one geographical location. This implies that the environmental benefits of land (of which 
biodiversity is an important part) to a large extent depend on the time that the land is retired; for 
some benefits, it might be ecologically ineffective for a parcel of land to be retired for only a 
short period of time. This is true of benefits that hinge on the stature of vegetation. 
  The increase in vegetation stature has considerable ecological impact.  MacArthur and 
MacArthur (1961) conduct a census of bird species in four U.S states differing in plant species 
composition, foliage height profiles and latitude to determine the potential influence of these 
factors on bird diversity.  Results suggest that increasing vegetation stature is a primary driving 
force in the establishment of bird species.   
  Besides biodiversity, vegetation stature also plays an important role in the modification 
of the hydrological cycle and the establishment of soil horizons.  Bosch and Hewlett (1982) 
study the impacts of afforestation on the water yields from small experimental catchments and 
show that the increased water use by forest cover compared to other smaller stature vegetation 
reduces water yields.  In other words, trees dry out the soil, and bind it with their roots to a much 
greater extent than grass species.  Results suggest that most forms of soil erosion can be reduced 
to a more significant extent if land is forested with trees than with smaller stature vegetation.   8
  Vegetation stature, according to Forman and Godron (1986), increases in a sigmoid (a 
special case of the logistic function) or S-shaped fashion over time.  The reason for this, as 
suggested by ecologists (Horn, 1971), is plants’ competition for light, which causes a general 
increase in the height of vegetation.  Being taller gives a plant an obvious advantage in the 
competition for light.  But that advantage comes at a cost. Very tall plants need to be strong 
enough to withstand tremendous forces like winds, snow and ice, forces from which shorter 
plants are protected.  Thus, competition for light would lead plants to grow until the cost of 
further height offsets the advantage.  Like the logistic function, height of vegetation rises up to 
and eventually levels off at a constant horizontal limit. 
Given that many environmental benefits, such as biodiversity and reduction of soil 
erosion, are to a large extent determined by vegetation stature, and that the increase in vegetation 
stature follows a logistic function, it might be reasonable to assume that environmental benefits 
from land retirement also increase in a logistic fashion. However, the exact shape of a particular 
logistic function will depend on the identity of the ecosystem (e.g. vegetation matures more 
rapidly in some places) and the precise nature of the benefit (e.g. erosion control can be better 
provided for by low-stature grasses than can some kinds of wildlife populations.) 
  3.2 Economic studies of conservation programs: There have already been many studies 
on land conservation programs.  One set of papers focuses on the participation behavior of land 
owners and tries to identify the factors that might influence enrollment in such programs. For 
example, empirical work by Force and Bill (1989) relates adoption of CRP to a range of 
socioeconomic and attitudinal factors. Konyar and Osborn (1990) model the probability of 
farmer participation in the CRP as discrete choice problem; under their framework, a farmer 
participates if the expected utility of participation is greater than the expected utility of not   9
participating. They estimate the model using region-level data for the entire U.S., and find 
(among other things) that land value and expected net returns with and without participation 
influence the probability of CRP participation. Mclean-Meyinsse et al. (1994) explore the 
relative lack of participation in the CRP by small farmers who have highly erodible cropland.  
They find that complaints about low program payments tend to occur most frequently among 
farmers with larger farms and higher average land returns. Parks and Schorr (1997) present a 
conceptual model of a Northeastern farmer’s decision to participate in a program such as the 
CRP.  The owner’s problem is modeled to be a choice of optimum amounts if any of land to 
enroll in the CRP program and to sell, respectively, in such a way as to maximize discounted 
profits including land sales.  The model then supports an econometric study of participation in 
the CRP by Northeastern landowners, which finds that the CRP is relatively unimportant to 
agricultural land owners in metropolitan counties where land values outstrip program payments. 
  Since land conservation easements can be non-permanent, landowners are theoretically 
free to choose whatever practice to perform on their land once the contract expires.  For this 
reason, post-contract land-use decisions of land owners have also become a focus of many 
research papers. For example, Kalaitzandonakes and Monson (1994) investigate the influence of 
economic, personal, and attitudinal factors on the intended conservation effort of a sample of 126 
CRP contract holders after their contracts have expired.  Economic factors were found to 
dominate the decision about future conservation effort. Skaggs et al. (1994) use a multinomial 
logit model to identify characteristics influencing New Mexico CRP participants’ post-CRP land 
use plans.  Of the 811 participants surveyed, 21% have expressed intention of going back to 
farming, 40% plan to re-enroll and the rest of them are undecided.  Results indicate post-CRP 
land use intentions will vary with attributes reflecting characteristics of the land enrolled,   10
socioeconomic variables, and participant attitudes (concern for erosion and interest in permanent 
land retirement). Johnson and Segarra (1995) evaluate four policy alternatives for CRP lands, 
upon expiration of the current contracts, in Hale County, Texas.  Results suggest that if CRP 
contracts are extended at the current average rental rate, 40 percent of the current enrollment 
would be expected to return to crop production, while 66 percent would return to crop production 
if the program is eliminated. Cooper and Osborn (1998) estimate the CRP re-enrollment 
decisions by farmers.  They apply econometric and simulation methods to a survey of over 8,000 
CRP contract holders, and find that up to 50% of current CRP acreage can be renewed at less 
than the current average CRP cost of $50 per acre (though achieving near 100% contract renewal 
would be expensive.) 
Are these programs worth the money we spend on them? There has been some research 
done on the environmental effects of land conservation programs. Goodwin and Smith (2003) 
estimate a model of cross-sectional, county-level data encompassing agricultural production and 
soil erosion both before and after the introduction of the CRP and the rapid expansion of crop 
insurance programs.  The study confirms the CRP significantly reduced erosion in areas where 
farmers have participated. Unfortunately, Wu’s (2000) estimate of the slippage effects of CRP  
shows that for each one hundred acres of cropland retired under the CRP in the central United 
States, twenty acres of non-cropland were converted to cropland, offsetting 9% and 14% of CRP 
water and wind erosion reduction benefits, respectively.   
  Studies of the design of a cost-effective CRP program have also considered the role of 
option values in determining appropriate rental payment, and have considered how to exploit 
targeting strategies to improve cost-effectiveness. Tegene et al. (1999) model a landowner’s 
decision to convert farmland to urban use as an irreversible investment under uncertainty, and   11
use that model to identify the appropriate level of conservation compensation By employing the 
real option framework, this research modifies earlier work on easement valuation by accounting 
for the role of land owner uncertainty in predicting future returns from development.  They find 
that conservation easements are under priced and the payments offered in conservation programs 
might not be large enough to attract land threatened by development. Schatzki (2003)’s empirical 
tests of conversion from agriculture to forest confirm his theoretical hypothesis that landowners 
consider the option values when making decisions to convert agricultural land to conservation 
status. His work provides guidance to those designing CRP payments, since he finds higher 
uncertainty in returns to all potential uses and lower correlation between shocks to agricultural 
and forest returns decreases the likelihood of conversion to forest through CRP. Wu, Zilberman, 
and Babcock (2001) compared the economic, environmental, and distributional impacts of four 
targeting strategies (targeting of resources for benefit-cost ratios, benefits alone, benefit per 
resource unit, and low costs) and identify circumstances under which different strategies are 
most useful.  
  Amongst all this work, there has been little discussion about the role that contract length 
might be able to play in the design of a cost-effective land conservation program.  In the 
literature on carbon sequestration, however, some researchers have begun to explore the 
determinants of optimal length for carbon offset contracts. Gulati and Vercammen (2005a) 
propose a one-shot decision model of carbon contract length. In the model, the authors assume 
that land always return to pre-contact use once the contract expires. Furthermore, there is only a 
single representative farmer, so that total environmental benefits are positively related to the 
chosen contract length. The authors conduct simulation analysis; their results suggest that a 
higher carbon price or a higher discount rate could lead to a longer optimal contract and that the   12
greater the similarity between the technologies used in and out of the contract, the longer the 
optimal contract. 
This model of the optimal contract length of carbon sequestration, although insightful, 
has two key features that limit its usefulness for modeling conservation contracts. First, since it 
models only a single round of contracting, it is unable to explore the impact of expected 
enrollment turnover at the re-contracting time on the optimal contract length. Second, the policy 
maker cares about total environmental benefits rather than the benefit from a single (even though 
typical) farmer. As we will see in the next section, total benefits from a group of heterogeneous 
farmers are not necessarily increasing in contract length. Enrollment considerations play an 
important factor in determining the optimal contract design.  
 
4. Model 
  We construct a theoretical model to determine the optimal design of land-conservation 
contracts – both contract length and payment – when the policy maker maximizes environmental 
benefits subject to a budget constraint, and farmer participation is voluntary. We use backwards 
induction to solve the policy maker’s problem given farmers’ behavior 
  4.1 Landowners’ enrollment decisions: The payoff to a farmer from not entering the 
conservation program in question is one period of farming income plus the present discounted 
value of the maximized stream of payments derivable from the land.  Similarly, the payoff from 
entering the program would be the present value of the program’s payment plus the maximized 
stream of payment discounted back from the end of the contract.  Here the “maximized stream of 
payments” is defined as the payoff to the farmer from doing whatever is optimal on his or her   13
land, which could include (but is not limited to) farming income, conservation program rental 
payment, or revenue from commercial development.  
  Given contract length L and rental payment P, a land owner chooses whether to enter into 
the land conservation program or not. We denote the farmer’s individual benefit from farming as 
Bf  which is assumed to follow a Brownian motion process (without drift) over time,  
   dZ t dB t f σ = ) (  where dt dZ =
2 ) (                                                                           (1) 
That is, an individual farmer’s income from farming will undergo chance fluctuation over time.   
 Let  V denote the discounted value of payoffs to the farmer from making his or her choice 
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since choosing (b) will yield a payoff of Bf  in this period and will in expectation lead to exactly 
the same choice between (a) and (b) in the next period.  Therefore we have that 
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If choosing (a) is optimal, then 
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since choosing (a) will yield a fixed rental payment P during the contract period and will in 
expectation lead to exactly the same choice between (a) and (b) once the contract expires (at the 
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1  and solve for the relationship between contract 
length L and payment P that will make a farmer indifferent between farming and entering land 
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  To explore the relationship between program payment and contract length, we show in 
Figure 1 a plot of the combinations of lump-sum
1 program payments and associated contract 
lengths that will make a farmer indifferent between farming and entering a conservation 
agreement. The contour lines represent indifference curves for different discount rates. On the 
same graph, we show the combinations of payment and contract length that have actually been 
offered under CRP and the Illinois CREP. One might expect that these combinations would 
roughly lie along an indifference curve, but in fact they do not. This represents a small empirical 
mystery. It could be that policy makers fail to understand the necessary tradeoffs between 
payments and contract lengths, and inadvertently offer excessively high (in the case of CREP) or 
low (in the case of CRP) payments for the shorter contracts. Alternatively, these distortions may 
reflect the presence of a more complex mechanism-design strategy; we explore this possibility in 
another paper. 
                                                 
1 The lump-sum payment is the present discounted value of the sum of the initial payment and continuous annual 
rental payments.    15
  The fraction of farmers that enter the program is determined by the number of farmers for 
whom the payoff to (a) exceeds the payoff to (b): 
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  We assume that the net incomes from farming are normally distributed across farmers 
according to ( )
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And the fraction of farmers for which equation (8) holds is given by        



















































                                                      (10) 
As can be seen from Equation 10, the fraction of farmers that will enter CRP or CREP depends 
on the payment P, contact length L, mean of net income from farming µ, variance of farming 
income σ
2 and the discount rate r.  Holding other variables constant, a higher payment will lead 
to more enrollments. Similarly, for a given payment, a longer contract length will result in fewer 
enrollments; for any given payment and contract length, a higher average farming income raises 
the opportunity cost of enrollment and therefore results in fewer enrollments; a larger variance 
means that net income from farming (and therefore the opportunity cost of enrollment) is quite 
different across farmers, thus limiting the possibility of attracting a large number of farmers by 
offering a universal payment and contract length.  The influence of the discount rate is unclear 
from the above formulation.   16
  4.2 Policy maker’s contract design problem: We assume that the government seeks to 
maximize the total present discounted value of environmental benefits from all enrolled land. 
The program is infinitely lived, with contracting opportunities every L years. The government 
may only choose a single contract to offer all farmers, and the total cost of the program is subject 
to a budget constraint. As long as a given parcel is enrolled in the conservation program, benefits 
from that parcel continue to evolve according to the environmental benefits function B(t). Once 
the parcel drops out of enrollment (i.e. a re-contracting opportunity is not accepted), the flow of 
benefits from the parcels falls to zero; if the parcel is later re-enrolled, benefits again begin to 
flow with the time counter re-set to zero. 







) ( . As shown 
in Figures 2 and 3, the shape of the environmental benefits function depends on the parameters a 
and k. A typical logistic function rises up to and eventually levels off at a constant horizontal 
limit. The function first increases at an increasing rate, and then increases at a decreasing rate.  
That is, the curve changes from being convex to concave. The rate at which a logistic function 
rises to its limiting value is completely determined by the exponential function in the 
denominator, in particular, by the parameters a and k. Specifically, the parameter k affects the 
location where the change from being convex to concave occurs. The Y intercept gets lower as k 
increases, which suggests that the starting value of environmental benefits is smaller for a higher 
k.  On the other hand, the parameter a affects the curvature of the logistic curve.  The logistic 
function becomes more concave as a increases, which means that the environmental benefits 
would increase more abruptly for a higher value of a. By varying these two parameters, our 
model can simulate conditions in a wide variety of ecological situations.   17
  Equation 10 gives the fraction Ф(L,P) of all farmers that will accept a contract offering of 
a given P and L. We assume there are n farmers in total, and denote N = n Ф(L,P) as the number 
of farmers that enroll for a given contract. Since ecological heterogeneity and targeting is not a 
primary focus of this paper, we assume that all farmers in the region have the same 
environmental benefits function so that these functions can be aggregated across farmers.  
Because individual farmers’ values of Bf evolve randomly with Brownian motion, the identity of 
the farmers that enroll in each contracting period will not be the same (though as long as the 
Brownian process does not have drift, the number of enrollments will not change.) The 
parameter α gives the percentage of enrollments that are new at each contracting period – 
something we refer to as the “churning factor.”
2 
  With this notation in place, we are able to write the government’s objective function. It 
seeks to maximize the present discounted value of environmental benefits from all enrolled 
parcels given infinite rounds of contracting:                 
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  The first line of Equation 11 shows the environmental benefits derived from the first 
contracting period, the second line shows those from the second period, and so on.  The 
                                                 
2 10.3 million acres of the current 34 million CRP acres, or roughly 30%, are re-enrolled parcels.     18
environmental benefits at each contracting period equal the benefits from all new enrollments 
plus those from all the lands that are already in the programs.  The total environmental benefits 
are derived by adding up the discounted environmental benefits of each period. Using theorems 
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where BC is the budget constraint and Equation 14 suggests that the discounted accumulated 
spending on land conservation programs must be kept within a preset budget limit. 
  This problem is too complex to derive analytical results. Hence, we simulate optimal 
program design in several situations to gain insight into the optimal contract design problem. 
 
5. Simulations and Results 
  We use parameter values as follows. The average net farm income per acre is just above 
$100 from the year 1997 to 2004 (USDA 2005), which we will use as our mean of net income 
from farming, µ. There are no reported figures on the variance of farming income, σ
2, but since 
farming income can vary largely from year to year (USDA 2005), we will assume a reasonably 
large standard deviation of farming income, σ = $100.  The discount rate is assumed to be 5%,   19
which is the most common rate that is available to agricultural financing (Federal Reserve Board 
2005).   
Under these baseline assumptions, a simulation was carried out to characterize the 
relationship among conservation program participation, environmental benefits from a single 
landowner, total benefits of a region, contact length and rental payment. In our model, the 
fraction of farmers that is going to enter land conservation programs depends on rental payment 
as well as contract length.  As shown in Figure 4, if we hold the rental payment constant, 
enrollment will decrease as contract length increases. The reason is that a long-term contract 
locks the farmer into a fixed agreement.  Hence there are more years of foregone opportunities, 
and this increased opportunity cost has to be compensated by higher payment. As Figure 5 
illustrates, the lump-sum rental payment necessary to induce enrollment increases as a 
decreasing rate as the contract length goes up; this is because discounting lowers the present 
value of the opportunity cost of a foregone year of income as the year moves further into the 
future. 
  Total environmental benefits from the program depend on the shape of the environmental 
benefits function.  Figure 4 shows the shape of the function two different types of ecological 
processes.  The blue line represents the case where environmental benefits start out high and 
level off after very short periods of time (e.g., erosion control benefits from perennial grass)  
while the green line reveals the process where it takes much longer for the benefits to reach 
maximum (e.g., wildlife populations dependent upon mature trees).  Hence, the optimal contract 
length might not always be the same for different functional forms of the environmental benefits, 
and in order to maximize social welfare, the policy maker would need to take into account the 
differences in the ecological processes that underlie conservation programs.                                      20
   The government’s problem is to maximize the environmental benefits from land at a 
given region.  On the one hand, the policy maker would prefer to keep a single parcel in 
conservation status for a sizable number of years in order to fully reap the benefits from land 
retirement; on the other hand, a longer contract length may lead to fewer enrollments, which may 
adversely affect the total environmental benefits that can be derived from the region.  Similarly, 
the policy maker has an incentive to raise the rental payment given that its objective is to 
maximize environment benefits through land retirement, but the budget constraints will limit its 
ability to increase the payment.  The tradeoffs between contract length and rental payment would 
make the policy maker’s task more complicated than if only rental payment is considered.    
  The policy implications of introducing contract length into the government’s decision 
making process can be illustrated using Figure 5, where a given level of total environmental 
benefits can be achieved by numerous combinations of payments and contract lengths. Under the 
traditional framework that considers only variation in payment, the only way to increase total 
environmental benefits is to increase rental payment. In contrast, when contract length can vary, 
we show that total environmental benefits can be increased through either a reduction or an 
increase in total rental payment.  For example, a longer contract will lead to more payment for 
each farmer but few enrollments, so the total payments might not be necessarily higher, but the 
total environmental benefits can be higher if the accumulation effect of environmental benefits 
from each farmer dominates the enrollment effect. Therefore under our framework, it is quite 
possible for the regulators to achieve a given (or even higher) total environmental benefits for 
less money. It all depends on the trade off between the ecological effect (environmental benefits 
from one farmer) and the enrollment effect (the number of farmers enrolled).       21
  Figure 6 also shows how the optimal contract length can differ for different 
environmental benefit functions. Figure 7 corresponds to the ecological process represented by 
the blue line (grasslands) and Figure 8 corresponds to that represented by the green line  
(forest) of Figure 4. Once we add in the budget constraint illustrated in Figure 9, we can solve for 
the combinations of contract length and payment that would maximize the total environmental 
benefits given that budget constraint. For example, suppose we have a budget constraint equal to 
$10,000. In the case of the grassland benefits (shown in Figure 7), the optimal contract length 
would be one year. Essentially, the contract length should be as short as possible, since we do not 
allow for a zero or negative contract length. In contrast, in the case of woodland benefits (shown 
in Figure 8) the optimal contract length is 21 years. Clearly, the optimal contract length can vary 
widely with the underlying ecological process. However, the best contract length is not a 
function simply of any particular feature of the environmental benefits function. For example, in 
both of our scenarios, the optimal contract length was shorter than the time needed for the flow 
of benefits to level off at its maximum. 
  To explore the determinants of optimal contract length in greater detail, we simulate the 
impact on optimal contract design of non-ecological regional characteristics and the nature of the 
environmental benefit function. Specifically, we show how L* varies with the rate of turnover in 
the identity of parcels that enroll in sequential enrollment periods, the mean value of the net 
income from farming, and the starting value of the environmental benefits.  
Figure 10 shows graphs of the impact of the churning factor (α) on optimal contract 
length (L*) for two different types of ecological settings. As can be seen from these graphs, for 
both ecological processes, the churning factor is positively related to the optimal contract length. 
Policy makers should consider offering longer contracts while designing these programs if there   22
is evidence suggesting that the turnover rate on such programs is high. Another interesting thing 
to note is that the optimal contract length is increasing at a much faster rate when the churning 
factor is below 10% than when it goes beyond 10%. For example, in the “forest” case, the 
optimal contract length increases by 9 years (from 17 years to 26 years) when the churning factor 
increases from 1% to 10%, while a change in the churning factor all the way from 10% to 90% 
only lengthens the optimal contract by another 7 years (from 26 years to 33 years). The same is 
true for the “grassland” case, but in this setting the optimal contract length is close to zero for all 
values of α. This finding suggests that the effect of churning on the optimal contract length is 
small for ecological services that mature quickly.  
Figure 11 shows the impact of mean farm income (µ) on optimal contract length (L*) for 
the same two types of ecosystems. We observe a negative relationship between mean farm 
income and the optimal contract length. This suggests that policy makers should consider 
offering shorter contracts in areas where the average farmer makes more money from farming. 
Under our framework, a farmer determines whether to enroll into conservation programs based 
on his or her comparison between the payoffs from farming and the payoffs from enrollment. In 
regions where agricultural productivity is higher, it is more difficult for policy makers to 
convince farmers to give up farming. As a result, more “sweeteners” (in the form of either a 
higher payment or a shorter contract) need to be offered to these farmers in order to get them 
interested in these conservation programs. In the “forest” setting, optimal contract length does 
not fall very much over low levels of income, but between $600 and $1000/acre the optimal 
contract length falls by about 50% (from 25 years to just more than 12), after which point L* 
becomes robust again to changes in income. In the “grassland” case, the optimal contract length 
is always extremely low; any changes in L* with respect to mean farm income occur between   23
very low and medium levels of income. Our results suggest that while average farm income is 
generally inversely related to optimal contract length, the scale and pattern of that impact 
depends on the underlying ecological process.  
Finally, we investigate how optimal contract length varies with characteristics of the 
environmental benefit function. One important feature of that function is its Y-intercept, which 
indicates the level of annual benefits at the beginning of the restoration process as a fraction of 
the maximum benefits that will accrue each year once the benefit matures. Essentially, this is the 
starting value of the environmental benefits. The higher the starting value, the less time it takes 
for the ecological process to mature. Figure 12 suggests that shorter contracts should be offered 
when conservation aims to provide environmental benefits that mature quickly. In particular, our 
findings suggest that a change in the fraction of maximum annual benefits at T=0 has a big 
influence on the optimal contract length, which falls very rapidly as initial benefits increase from 
nothing to as low 10% of matured annual benefits.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We find that the optimal contract length depends on the trade off between an ecological 
effect (environmental benefits from one farmer) and an enrollment effect (the number of farmers 
enrolled).  On the one hand, the policy maker would prefer to keep a single parcel in 
conservation status for a sizable number of years in order to fully reap the benefits from land 
retirement; on the other hand, a longer contract length may lead to fewer enrollments, which 
reduces total environmental benefits from the region.  
  This study provides guidance for the manner in which contract length should be varied 
with characteristics of the ecological processes that yield benefits from land retirement. Optimal   24
contracts are longer when the environmental benefits in question – things like wetland services 
or woodland biodiversity – take time to develop. However, it is not typically optimal to have the 
indefinitely-lived contracts favored by some conservation groups, or even to offer contracts as 
long as the maturation period for the environmental services in question; high payments must be 
offered to induce farmers to accept such contracts, which would severely limit the number of 
acres enrolled.  
  Our findings also suggest that non-ecological regional characteristics could play an 
important role in the design of conservation programs. Specifically, optimal contracts are longer 
in regions where the turnover rate on conservation programs is high, although the effect of 
churning on the optimal contract length is small for ecological services that mature quickly. 
Moreover, we find that average farm income is inversely related to optimal contract length, due 
to the fact that more incentives are needed to attract higher-productivity farmers into 
conservation programs. Finally, these impacts on optimal contract length are different across 
different ranges of regional characteristics. Thus, to increase the benefits society reaps from the 
money spent on conservation programs, policy makers should take into account the direction of 
influence by these ecological and non-ecological characteristics, and work to determine the 
actual levels of these characteristics.      25
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Table 1: Contract Options in Land Conservation Programs 
 
Program Contract  Length Payment  Schedule 
CRP 10-15  rental+50%cost  sharing 











75% rental + 75% cost 
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Figure 1: Indifference Curves over Lump-Sum Program Payment and Contract Length 



























Note: The top line assumes r = 3%, the middle line assumes r = 5%, and the bottom line assumes 
r = 10%.  
* CRP contracts 
° CREP contracts – High Range 
+ CREP contracts – Low Range   30
Figure 2:  The effect of parameter k on the Environmental Benefits Function 


















Figure 3:  The effect of parameter a on the Environmental Benefits Function 
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Figure 4: Fraction Enrolled in Conservation Programs by Contract Length 
 
Figure 5: Fraction Enrolled in Conservation Programs by Contract Payment 
 
 




























































P = 2100  32































Figure 7: Contour Lines of Total Environmental Benefits 
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